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EXISTING RULES OF TRUST ADMINISTRATION:
A STRANGLEHOLD ON THE TRUSTEECONTROLLED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
II.

THE INCORPORATED BUsIN sS *
JAN Z. KRASNOW ECKI t

In Part I of this article I urged that the rules of trust administration be brought into line with the financial needs of a going enterprise,
that a recognition of accepted accounting practices is insufficient for this
purpose, and that a trustee-operated enterprise should be encouraged,
if not required, to make provision for its own survival out of its own
income, subject to the trustee's dual obligation to be impartial towards
successive beneficiaries and to make the trust assets productive.1 If this
proposal is not acceptable, estate planners will have to contend with
a law which at best recognizes the use of "accepted" accounting principles for the determination of distributable income. Since such principles, admittedly, do not purport to measure funds necessary for the
survival of the enterprise, only a carefully drawn trust instrument can
relieve the resulting pressures for its improvident strangulation. The
question left to be explored is whether incorporation will serve to insulate the enterprise from these pressures.
On this question we have the pioneer work of Edmund Cahn in
this Review,2 as well as more recent writings.3 Despite this work, the
courts have failed to furnish any clear guidance in this area. The decisions abound with broad generalities on which reliance by the trustee,
one way or the other, is fraught with danger. For example, in In the
Matter of Koretzky,4 the Supreme Court of New Jersey, echoing Professor Scott,' declared that "where a fiduciary holds sufficient shares to
control actually or substantially the conduct of the corporation he is
* This is Part II of a two-part article. Part I appeared in the February 1962
issue, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 506.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1951, B.C.L.
1952, M.A. 1955, Oxford; LL.M. 1956, Harvard University.
1Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold on the
Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise-I. The UnincorporatedBusiness, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 506 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecd].
2 Cahn, Estate Corporations,86 U. PA. L. REv. 136 (1937).
8 Note, The Fiduciary Aspects of Estate Corporations, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 738
(1959); Note, The Trust Corporation: Dual Fiduciary Duties and the Conflict of
Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 713 (1961).
48 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951).
52 ScoTT, TRusTs § 193.2, at 1462 (2d ed. 1956).
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under a duty to exercise that control for the benefit of the trust," ' and,
further, that "in voting shares of stock fiduciaries are under a duty to
vote in such a way as to promote the interests of the beneficiaries." '
If this broad proposition is to be controlling, it would appear that the
conduct of an incorporated enterprise controlled by a trustee is governed by the same outmoded principles of trust law inveighed against
in Part I of this article. The facts in Koretzky suggest, however, not
only that the stated principle may be of narrow application, but that the
problem we have set ourselves is one of considerable subtlety.
In Koretzky, the testator had left all of the outstanding shares of
stock in Bright Star Warehouse Company (ten shares) and 30,600
shares of stock in Bright Star Battery Company (out of a total of
39,000 outstanding shares) to his executors in trust for certain members of his family. The gravamen of th e complaint against the executors, seeking their removal as trustees, was that they had approved a
fraudulent issue of twenty-four additional shares by the warehouse
company-an issue which reduced the estate's control of that company
from 100%, to 29.4%o-and had falsified the company's books for this
purpose; that they had approved and participated in an unauthorized
gift of $25,000 by the battery company to the testator's son-in-law; and
that they had voted to elect to the battery company's board of directors
certain directors of the warehouse company who they knew had participated in the fraudulent stock issue.
The trial court, finding these allegations to be true, ordered the
trustees removed and appointed another in their stead. It also ordered
that the trustees resign as directors of both companies, and that "management and operations" of the two corporations be "vested exclusively"
in the substituted trustee.8 Two points are significant to our discussion.
The broad generalization concerning the trustees' duties, quoted earlier,
is to be found in that part of the supreme court's decision which affirmed
the removal of the trustees. Since the conduct of corporate affairs
complained of by the beneficiaries of the trust was clearly conduct for
which relief could be granted under corporate law,' the court may be
requiring no more of the trustee than that he prevent, if he can, conduct of corporate affairs which violates corporate law.
The key to the court's decision on the question which concerns
us is to be found in its reversal of that part of the trial court's decree
which ordered that management of the corporations be vested in the
substituted trustee. Here the court stated: "The corporations were
6 8 N.J. at 526-27, 86 A.2d at 248.
7Id. at 526, 86 A.2d at 248, citing 2 Scow, TRUSTS § 193.1, at 1459 (2d ed. 1956).
8 8 N.J. at 520, 86 A.2d at 245.
9 See 3 FLzrcHEn, CoRo1ATioNs § 1011 (perm ed. rev. repl. 1947).
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not made parties defendant. The business of a corporation is operated
by its board of directors, and ownership by the estate of the controlling
interest of the outstanding stock confers no power upon the fiduciaries
of the estate (whether they be executors or trustees) to bind the corporation." 'o In this connection, it is significant that the court cited
D'Arcangelo v. D'Arcangelo." In that case, the testator had bequeathed fourteen shares out of a total of twenty outstanding in his
jitney bus business to his two sons, directing them to "engage my
brother Federico . . . as one of the drivers of said jitney bus and

pay him a salary of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars per week, until he is
able [sic] to work ....

,,

This provision was held unenforce-

12

able and void for the reason that "a contract by the two sons, acting by
virtue of their ownership of a majority of the outstanding stock, with
Federico, would not bind the corporation, since our Corporation Law
gives to the board of directors the power and duty of managing the
business of the corporation." 13 However, the court noted: "If testator
had been the sole owner of the corporation and all the capital stock had
devolved on [the two sons]

.

.

.

, subject to the direction that they

engage Federico, I take it that the direction would have been effective
and enforceable."

14

D'Arcangelo refers to a well-known body of corporate law governing the extent to which shareholders may, by agreement, tie the
hands of directors in advance on matters normally within their discretion.1 5 The case involved an express direction by the settlor to his
legatees, as controlling shareholders, affecting the conduct of corporate
affairs. But the rules of trust administration are based on the settlor's
presumed intent and thus constitute implied directions to the trustee.
Therefore, the question whether the trustee is bound to cause declarations of dividends in accordance with what section 7 of the Uniform
Principal and Income Act regards as income 1 is, in the last analysis,
the same as the question of whether effect could be given to an express
provision in the trust instrument directing that the trustee cause distribution of all the earnings of the corporation.
Edmund Cahn took the position that the question whether the
trustees must cause the corporation to follow the rules of trust admin10 8 N.J. at 532, 86 A.2d at 251.
11 137 N.J. Eq. 63, 43 A.2d 169 (Ch. 1945).
12 Id. at 65, 43 A.2d at 171.
13 Id. at 66-67, 43 A.2d at 171-72.
14 Id. at 66, 43 A.2d at 171.
15fDelaney, The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be Tied in Advance, 50
COLUm. L. Rv. 52 (1950); Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely
Held16Corporation,59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950).
See Krasnowiecki 511-13.
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istration turns on an interpretation of the settlor's intent. He was
willing to admit that "the courts have never been particularly sympathetic with the predicament of a minority stockholder in a close corporation. In the absence of proof of fraud or waste he is usually remediless." 17 And while he saw in the cases some support for the view that
the trustee may not have a duty to cause the distribution of all of the
income of a corporation, he urged that trustees exercise their discretion
with "considerable caution." is This is undoubtedly an accurate summary of the cases and, as such, it offers to the trustee little in the way of
concrete guidance. It exposes him to the shifting applications of mere
generalities and tends, at the very least, to turn the trustee-controlled
corporation into a timid, inhibited operation.
It therefore seems essential to consider whether, in the cases circumscribing the power of shareholders to bind the corporation in advance on matters normally within the discretion of the directorate, there
may be found a refuge for the trustee who desires that the vitality of
the enterprise go unimpaired.
I. THE TRUSTEE WITH WORKING CONTROL
As is indicated in D'Arcansgelo, when a trustee has working control of a corporation whose stock is owned in part by persons who are
not trustees of the trust, his actions are governed by the normal rules
of corporate law. Although there are a number of recent cases sustaining agreements by less than all of the shareholders on matters not
normally within the province of shareholder action,' 9 a careful reading
of these cases reveals that the agreements sustained in them, far from
sapping the vitality of the corporation, were essential to it. For example, Hart z. Bell"0 involved an agreement under which Bell, as a
condition to making a loan to the corporation bailing it out of insolvency, acquired from the controlling stockholder a sufficient number of
shares to give him control and which provided that no dividends should
17 Cahn, supra note 2, at 145. It has been suggested that adherence to principles
of trust administration by the controlling trustee, whether he be director or shareholder,
may involve a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation or the other shareholders.
Note, 109 U. P.,. L. REv. 713, 726-28 (1961). But this duty comes into play only
in extreme cases of fraud and oppression and would seem to furnish rather limited
protection to the trustee who desires that the vitality of the enterprise go unimpaired.
See text accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
is Calm, supra note 2, at 144.
19 merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal. App. 2d 106, 202 P.2d 748
(Dist. Ct. App. 1949) ; E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.
288 (1954) ; see Delaney, sutpra note 15, at 59-61, urging that such agreements should
not be held invalid merely because some shareholders did not participate, citing dictum
in Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 320, 119 N.E. 559, 561 (1918), and other authorities.
But see Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, modified, 125 A.2d 588 (Del. Ch. 1956),
revd on other grounds, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957).
20222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946).
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be declared or paid by the corporation until the loan was repaid. The
minority shareholders sought a declaration that the agreement was invalid and a return of the stock transferred to Bell. The court sustained
the agreement, stressing the value of it to the business. Yet it felt impelled to engage in sophistry. The agreement, said the court, "'that
no dividends shall be declared or paid', in the absence of a further provision implementing an intent of performance through a dummy directorate, is reasonably to be construed as merely a declaration of desirable
corporate policy .

.

.

. [The parties to the agreement]

.

.

.

(and

in fact Bell alone) controlled a majority of the common stock and were
therefore in a position to elect directors friendly to corporate policies in
which they believed without making any effort to throttle their official
discretion." 1 If Bell alone had not acquired sufficient control to secure
the action desired, if the issue had been whether he could enforce the
agreement against the transferor (rather than whether the agreement
was void for the purpose of an action seeking the return of the shares
transferred to Bell), this ground for sustaining the agreement would
have posed an insuperable obstacle to enforcement.
We are concerned with the question whether a court could enforce
those provisions of the trustee's agreement with the settlor which are
implied through the rules of trust administration-provisions which
are hardly conducive to the vitality of the enterprise. There can be
little doubt that this enforcement would run counter to all the authorities in the corporate field-even those which occasionally sustain agreements between less than all of the shareholders. Fortunately, we need
not labor the point, for there is strong authority in the trust field itself
that normal rules of trust administration will not be enforced where the
trust owns less than all of the outstanding shares of the corporation.
The strongest case is Rosencrans v. Fry.2 By his will, the settlor
left 3,025 shares (slightly less than half of all outstanding shares) in a
plumbing corporation to his wife and to Fry, a trusted friend and a
director of the company, as trustees, directing them to pay the income
to the wife for life, the corpus to be distributed among named nephews.
The will gave Fry the option to purchase the stock left in trust at $25
per share-a price which was slightly more than one-third of the book
value on the testator's death. For five years following the settlor's
death, the widow received on the average approximately $6,500 annu2 1 Id. at 77, 23 N.W.2d at 379-80.
22 21 N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Ch. 1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905
(1953). For other cases to the same effect, see Long v. Rike, 50 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 657 (1931); Dailey v. Wight, 94 Md. 269, 51 Atl. 38 (1902)
(trustee's accountability for salary as director) ; Perry v. Perry, 339 Mass. 470, 160
N.E.2d 97 (1959) ; Matter of Doelger, 164 Misc. 590, 299 N.Y. Supp. 565 (Surr. Ct
1937), rez/d, 254 App. Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334, affd inem., 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.2d
42 (1938).
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ally in dividends from the corporation, in addition to her salary as a
corporate officer. Fry then exercised this option to purchase the 3,025
shares held by the trust, whereupon the widow claimed that he must
account to her for all the income retained by the corporation in respect
of the trust shares since the death of her husband.
Since her husband had placed Fry in a position of divided loyalty,
the widow was not able to rest her claim solely on this ground. To
succeed she had to show that the trustee was under a duty, during the
years the stock was held in trust, to secure larger dividend distributions.
It is important to note that a decision in her favor could not have affected the operations of this business. Furthermore, since the trustee
stood to gain personally by the accumulation of earnings, the facts presented the strongest case for the recognition of such a duty. The trial
court admitted that "in some settings a trustee situated as was Fry
might equitably be required, as between himself and the beneficiary, to
account for a portion of the earnings even though in a stockholder's
suit against the corporation the facts would not demonstrate that arbitrary conduct which is the sine qua non of judicial interference with the
directors' judgment as to dividend action." 2 3 This, however, the court
held, was not such a case. The retention of earnings was justified in
the light of the company's needs, and the widow had received a reasonable income from the dividends which were declared. The court noted
that the widow was a director and "voted for the course pursued" and
that Fry had offered to exercise his option three years earlier, before
much of the allegedly improper accumulation, but had been dissuaded
by the widow's opposition.
The decisive point, however, is to be found in the court's discussion
of the principle stated in Koretzky concerning the trustee's duty to
exercise his control so as to favor the beneficiaries of the trust. "But
the quoted principle," said the court, "does not embrace a duty to advance the interests of a beneficiary at the expense of the corporation and
other outstanding stockholders' interest." '
Thus the court stressed Fry's duty as a director. It is often stated
that "it is the duty of a board of directors to manage the corporate
affairs solely in the interest of the corporation, quite regardless of the
effect of its policies and management upon the fortunes of individual
stockholders in the corporation." 25 While the courts pay lip service
to this principle, the cases merely support the view that a director cannot join in a fraudulent effort by the controlling shareholders to take
2321 N.J. Super. at 300, 91 A.2d at 167.
24 Id. at 301, 91 A.2d at 168.
25 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Rice, 186 Fed. 204, 218 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1910),
aff'd, 184 Fed. 878 (5th Cir. 1911).
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the property of the minority.2 6 The line drawn here appears to be the
same as the line drawn on the question of the majority shareholders'
supposed fiduciary obligation to the minority. Professor Gower, comparing English and American positions, well summarized the cases:
In both countries lip service is paid to the alleged rule that the
majority stockholders must exercise their powers as fiduciaries."' But in neither country do the decisions appear really
to support this." In both the true rule seems to be that the
majority must not expropriate the property of the company
or the minority, and here again the American courts have been
more ready to apply the principle."
A court of equity is, of course, free to expand the principle in order
to furnish a rationale for protecting a trustee in Fry's position. But the
trust rule in question, which would simply require the trustee to pursue
an absurdly liberal dividend policy, does not immediately fall within
the normal run of cases finding an abuse of a director's fiduciary duties
to the corporation.s° As we shall see, unless the dividends impair
capital or are followed closely by insolvency, corporate law neither
views excessively liberal dividend policies as unlawful nor renders the
2

6Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W.
1056 (1917) ; Schmid v. Lancaster Ave. Theater Co., 244 Pa. 373, 91 AtI. 363 (1914) ;
Newcomer v. Mountain Springs Ice & Cold Storage Co., 63 S.D. 81, 256 N.W. 359

(1934).

27

See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36
(3d Cir. 1947). In England this duty is generally expressed in the formula
of Lindley, M.R., in Allen v. Gold Reefs, Ltd., [1900] 1 Ch. 656, 671 (C.A.),
that the majority must exercise their voting powers "bona fide for the benefit
of the company as a whole." For the latest discussion of the meaning of this
formula, see Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas, Ltd., [1951] Ch. 286 (C.A.
1950).
[Original footnote renumbered.]
28 "Cf., e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 675 (1942); Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F2d 351 (7th Cir. 1936). For
a review of the English cases, see GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAW 498-518 (1954)."
[Original footnote renumbered.]
29 Gower, Sonme Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
[Some of the original footnotes renumbered and
HAgv. L. REv. 1369, 1383 (1956).
others omitted.] See also Note, Fiduciary Obligation of Majority Stockholders, 51
YALE L.. 1034 (1942), discussing Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co.,
174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 263 App.
Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934, aff'd, 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
30 Directors may become liable for loss occasioned by mismanagement or failure
§§ 1010-64 (perm. ed.
0xs
to exercise due care. See generally 3 FLETCHER, COoRA
rev. repl. 1947). But the cases involve asset loss occasioned by grossly improvident
undertakings or by employee defalcations. Excessive dividends leading to an orderly
winding up of the enterprise do not seem to fall within this category. But see note 31
infra. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. First State Bank, 54 S.W.2d 358, 359-60 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932), the case closest on point, held that a declaration of dividends out of
profits lawfully available for this purpose by directors whose sole motive was to secure
sufficient cash (for themselves as shareholders) to meet outstanding personal obligations did not constitute self-dealing. But the court stated by way of dictum that
the directors may be charged with mismanagement.
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directors liable therefor.3 This principle of dividend law has disturbed those who see that failure to retain an adequate surplus in an
inflationary economy is bound to result in a failure of the business. 2
Thus trustees who desire to see the vitality of the business go unimpaired are best supported by the rationale of the cases protecting the
corporation against agreements by controlling shareholders which expressly seek to deprive the directors of their right (fictitious though it
may be in fact) to exercise their best judgment. The point I am trying
to make here is that the principles which govern the trustee who is
willing to cause the corporation to operate in accordance with the
outmoded rules of trust administration are totally different from the
principles applicable to the trustee who, in the exercise of his honest
judgment, prefers to see the corporation run like a corporation. In
the former case, the point at which the trustee, as controlling shareholder or director, would become liable to the minority shareholders,
the corporation, or creditors may not be reached until most of the
vitality has gone out of the enterprise. In the latter case, the trustee's
protection against suit by the income beneficiaries of the trust is to be
found in the cases which refuse to enforce any agreement by the majority shareholders to tie in advance the hands of the directors on
31
Even when the challenged dividend involved a clear capital impairment, courts
have not been consistent in allowing recovery by the corporation against the directors
beyond what may be needed to satisfy creditors. See Spiegel v. Beacon Participants,
Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 426-29, 8 N.E.2d 895, 912-13 (1937) ; Manning v. Campbell, 264
Mass. 386, 162 N.E. 770 (1928). The Pennsylvania courts have consistently allowed
recovery of the entire capital impairment dividend. See Cochran v. Shetler, 286 Pa.
226, 133 Atl. 232 (1926) (by receiver); Loan Society v. Eavenson, 248 Pa. 407, 94
AtI. 121 (1915) (by corporation). In Hochman v. Mortgage Finance Corp., 289
Pa. 260, 137 Atl. 252 (1927), the court speculated that such a recovery, to the full
amount of the dividend, "may, perhaps, be invoked for the protection of the minority
stockholders of a 'going concern! when the impairment of capital while not rendering
the corporation insolvent, interferes with its activities and endangers its existence."
Id. at 267, 137 Atl. at 254. But the court denied recovery in that case because the
corporation was then in the process of voluntary liquidation. The Hochman dictum
may indeed support the view that even lawful dividends may be questioned by the
minority when they impair the "going concern" nature of the enterprise. However,
in the absence of statute declaring capital impairment dividends illegal, it has been
held that the common law does not render directors liable except to the extent of
amounts necessary to pay creditors and that "a mere distribution of the property of
the corporation among its stockholders would not, at common law, be such a waste
or misappropriation of its property as would justify the corporation in maintaining
a cause of action against the directors for the amount thus distributed." Hutchinson
v. Stadler, 85 App. Div. 424, 431, 83 N.Y. Supp. 509, 514 (1903); De Raismes v.
United States Lithograph Co., 161 App. Div. 781, 146 N.Y. Supp. 813 (1914). If
this view holds good for capital impairment dividends, in the absence of statute, a
fortiori it does so for dividends out of earnings legally available for this purpose even
though they impair the business as a going concern and lead to liquidation. However,
as suggested later, see text accompanying note 71 infra, a program for declaring all
earnings in dividends, if sustained over a long period, is as likely to lead to insolvency
as are capital impairment dividends.
32 See Dean, Provision for Capital Exhaustimp Under Changing Price Levels,
65 HA.v. L. REv. 1339 (1952); Kiley, Some Legal Problems Arising from Profit
Determinationin Periods of Rising Prices, 24 U. CiNc. L. REv. 519 (1955) ; Spear,
Dividend Policies Under Changing Price Levels, 27 HAev. Bus. REv. 612 (1949).
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matters normally within their discretion. Most of the cases deny the
validity of such agreements, even though beneficial to the enterprise, on
the ground that the minority is, at least in theory, entitled to the free
discretion of the directorate. 33 No case has been found in which such
an agreement has been sustained where there was even the slightest
suggestion that it might sap the vitality of the business.
As was recognized by the trial court in Rosencrans v. Fry, the conduct of the trustee should be carefully scrutinized-not to see that he
followed the rules of trust administration but to see that he acted
honestly for the benefit of the corporation, particularly where, as in
34
Fry's case, the trustee stands to gain by the expansion of the business.
But the position of the courts seems quite clear that where the trustee
does not hold all of the shares of the corporation he will not be held in
breach of trust merely because he has failed to prevent accumulations
of surplus necessary to the continued vitality and growth of the business. The effect of these decisions is to liberate the trustee and the
enterprise from the stifling application of trust rules as to principal and
income and to focus the trustee's duty to make the assets productive of
income, not on the corporate surplus, but on the continued retention of
the business interest by the trust. This is a sound position, and one
which I would like applied to all business enterprises held in trust.
The position taken by the courts in actions by the beneficiaries
against a trustee who merely holds a controlling interest in a corporation finds its exact counterpart in the cases involving actions by the
beneficiaries or one of several trustees against the corporation for a
declaration of dividends.

In Murray v. Beattie Mfg. Co.,3 5 one of the

trustees of three trusts which held 950 out of a total of 3,000 outstanding shares in the company also held 700 shares in his own right and
was a corpus beneficiary of the trust. Moreover, his son, the holder of
200 shares, served as a director of the corporation and was a corpus
beneficiary under the terms of the trusts. The income beneficiaries of
the trust brought an action against the company for a declaration of
dividends. 36 The vice-chancellor stated firmly that the corporation
need not respond to the peculiar interests of an income beneficiary of a
33 See Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 25, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946) ("there was
one stockholder not a party to the contract who might be injuriously affected by it') ;
Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309, 314 (1882); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799, 815

(1956).

34 See Perry v. Perry, 339 Mass. 470, 160 N.E.2d 97 (1959) ; Matter of Moot,
285 App. Div. 785, 141 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1955).

35 79 N.J. Eq. 322, 82 Atl. 1038 (Ch. 1911).

36 Although the more common procedure is for the trustee to bring the action on
behalf of the beneficiaries, they are not without remedy when he refuses to do so.
From the earliest days, beneficiaries could obtain relief in equity to compel an unwilling trustee to sue third parties on behalf of the trust. Today, the action against
the trustee and against the third party may be combined in one proceeding. 3 Scorr,
TRUSTS § 282.1 (2d ed. 1956). But in such an action, all the beneficiaries are neces-
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trust, where the interests of its other shareholders would not be served
thereby. 7 But noting that the trustee and his son, as corpus beneficiaries of the trusts and controlling directors of the company, were
8
unable "to act fairly" with the shares of stock held in trust, subjected
their dividend policy to special statutory scrutiny and decreed a substantial distribution. In this he was reversed. There is language in
the opinion on appeal suggesting that the strong presumption in favor
of the board of directors, established in dividend cases in general, should
not give way even in cases such as this. But the decision appears to
rest more on a disagreement with the chancellor's view of the company's need for additional capital." It seems obvious that, whatever
the language employed, the courts tend to scan the dividend policies
of the directorate with a jealous eye in the context of close corporations4 The fact that the increased value of the business may not inure
to the benefit of minority shareholders who do not have a market for
their shares has been given weight.4 And the peculiar plight of a life
tenant has caused one court to state expressly that the actions of the
directors will be subjected to special scrutiny.'
It is important to note that the plight of the life tenant has been
exacerbated by the abandonment of the Pennsylvania rule of apportionment.4 This point is suggested by Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co.,"
in which a trustee's claim, on behalf of his income beneficiaries, for a
declaration of dividends was denied. Because of the peculiar facts of
the case, the denial itself is not significant 4 5 But what is interesting
sary parties.

Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.

denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960), 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 1231 (1960) (arguing that a beneficiary of a trust should be recognized as a shareholder for purposes of a shareholder's
derivative action). On the question of whether an action for the declaration of dividends is derivative in the right of the corporation, see Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y.
456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954) (holding it derivative) ; Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp.,
230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956) (not derivative) ; 2 HORNSrN, CoRpoRATI0 LAW AND

PRACTIcE § 602 (1959).
37 "The situation of corporations would be hard indeed if they had to act or
refrain from acting not only with their stockholders in view, but also with regard to
the interests of all the beneficiaries of stock held in trust under wills or deeds." 79
N.J. Eq. at 336, 82 Atl. at 1045.
38 Id. at 336-37, 82 AUt. at 1045.
39
Murray v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 79 N.J. Eq. 604, 610-11, 82 Atl. 1038, 1040-41
(Ct. Err. & App. 1912).
40 See, e.g., Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 331, 67 S.E.2d 355 (1951).
41 Raynolds v. Diamonds Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 60 At. 941 (Ch.

1905).2

4 Ochs v. David Maydole Hammer Co., 138 Misc. 665, 246 N.Y. Supp. 539
(Sup. Ct. 1930). See generally Note, Minority Shareholder Suits to Compel Decla-

ration of Dividends, 64 HAIv. L. REv. 299 (1950).
43 See Krasnowiecki 539-41.
Minn. 382, 272 N.W. 277 (1937).
44199
45
The trust held a controlling interest in the corporation during the years 1912
to 1933. Since 1912 the company had paid on an average over 15% annually in dividends on its common stock. In 1933 the trust lost control of the corporation because
of a deadlock between its two trustees. Nevertheless, in 1934 the company paid
dividends of $254,016.28, although current earnings were only $145,992.12.
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is that the trustee sought declaration of a stock dividend, should his
claim to a cash dividend be denied. The trustee, acting on behalf of
the income beneficiaries, had in mind the Pennsylvania apportionment
rule which was then in force in Minnesota.4" The court, in denying
this claim on the ground that the interest of the other shareholders of
the corporation must be considered, pointed out that the income beneficiaries were not without a remedy4 The court was obviously thinking of the possibility that the trustee might sell the stock and thus
obtain for the income beneficiaries the benefit of the corporate accumulations-again through the apportionment rule.
With the adoption of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, the
possibility of selling some of the shares or of securing a distribution of
stock dividends as a solution to the current income beneficiary's claim
to the corporate earnings is no longer open to the trustee. Because
under the act the proceeds of sales and stock dividends are corpus and
are not apportioned." Thus, with the abolition of the apportionment
rule, the pressures for larger distributions by a trustee-controlled corporation may be significantly increased.4" This point is of the utmost
importance when the trustee owns all of the stock of a corporation,
since in these cases, as we shall see, he is not as well protected against
the pressure to distribute all income as he is when he merely holds a
controlling interest.
46 Id. at 395, 272 N.W. at 283.
47 Id. at 397, 272 N.W. at 283-85.
4

SUNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT

§§

3(2), 5(1).

It should be noted that the Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act § 5(1)
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1961) provides that stock dividends of 6% or less per annum
are to be treated as income. This qualification to the existing Uniform Act was
recently adopted judicially in Pennsylvania. Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d
86 (1961). Thus, in Pennsylvania, in jurisdictions in which the prestatutory "Pennsylvania" apportionment rule is still in force, or where the Revised Act is adopted,
the trustee who is in a position to cause the corporation to declare stock dividends
may find therein a solution to the problem of keeping the corporation going and the
current income beneficiary's claim on the earnings satisfied. There are some rather
serious problems with this solution. The current income beneficiary may not be
expected to remain satisfied with small distributions of stock unless he can convert
them into cash. If the stock is freely transferable and has a good market (which is
unlikely) the trustee must be prepared to justify a gradual loss of control. Even if
the current income beneficiary is satisfied to retain the stock, there will be a gradual
shift of control from the trust to the beneficiary. In Steele Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103
A.2d 409 (1954), remaindermen charities brought suit to prevent the trustee from
apportioning (in accordance with the prestatutory apportionment rule) a stock dividend to herself as life tenant. The apportionment would have reduced the trust holding
in the corporation from 49% to 39%. The court held against the remaindermen
charities, stressing, however, the fact that the life tenant-trustee, while a director
of the corporation, "could not have prevented the stock dividend." Id. at 257, 103
A.2d at 413. The case offers little encouragement to the trustee who actively employs
his control of the corporation to cause the distribution of a stock dividend which,
when apportioned to the life tenant, results in loss of control-particularly if the
remaindermen are close members of the settlor's family rather than charities. Yet
twelve years of 6% stock dividends would cut the trust's control in half. To avoid
loss of control, the trustee might offer to purchase the stock from the life tenant.
In fact, this would be the effect of the New Jersey rule under which the life tenant
49
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II.

THE TRUSTEE WITH SOLE CONTROL 50

A. The Effect of Corporate Law
When the trustee owns all of the outstanding capital stock of the
corporation (or all the stock except the qualifying shares of the board
of directors) in trust, or owns some of the stock in trust and the remainder in his own right, it is obvious that the rationale of Rosencrans
is merely entitled to a lien in the trust corpus for an amount which is equal to the
amount of earnings capitalized to support the stock dividend distribution to the trust.
In re Wehrman's Estate, 41 N.J. Super. 158, 124 A.2d 334 (1956). If the trustee has
other assets that may be liquidated for such repurchase or satisfaction of a lien, this
solution is reminiscent of the solution offered by trust law in connection with the
sole proprietorship held in trust-namely, that all necessary improvements and replacements in the business must come out of trust corpus. See Krasnowiecki 522-29. This
is the solution to which I object.
As will be noted in the remainder of this article, the rules governing a wholly
trustee-owned corporation appear to be quite different from those governing the
trustee's conduct when the corporation has minority shareholders whose interests
continue to be protected by the normal rules of corporate law. One additional result
of a stock dividend of such a wholly owned corporation which ends up in the hands
of the income beneficiaries may be that the law governing the trustee's conduct would
be changed to protect their interests, and many of the complex problems discussed
in the remainder of this article may be avoided.
GOThe situations in which the trustee does not hold sole control in his capacity
as trustee include two which deserve specific mention:
Balance of outstanding shares ozwned by trustee individually. The duties of the
trustee in the conduct of the corporation should be the same whether he owns all of
the outstanding shares in trust or part in trust and part in his own right. In the
latter situation, the courts are normally willing to presume that the settlor was aware
of the potential conflict of interest and condoned its existence. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647 (1930); Steele Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 257-58, 103
A.2d 409, 412-13 (1954) ; Flagg Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950). These cases
indicate that his conduct may not be questioned solely on the ground that he occupies
conflicting positions. It is obvious, however, that a trustee will not be permitted to
justify conduct objectionable as a matter of trust administration by a showing that
such conduct was necessary to the protection of his personal interests. This distinction
comes out very clearly from a comparison of cases such as Rosencrans v. Fry, 21
N.J. Super. 289, 91 A.2d 162 (Ch. 1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953), and
Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951) (trustee owned 50% of the
outstanding shares in trust and 50% in his own right). But cf. Dailey v. Wight, 94
Md. 269, 51 At. 38 (1902), where the court was willing to absolve the trustee from
a duty to account for his salary as director on the ground that he did not need the
trust stock to secure his election. Of the 300 outstanding shares of the company, 67
were owned by the trust, 100 by the trustee, and 133 by members of the trustee's
immediate family.
Balance of outstanding shares owned by corpus benwficiaries of the trust. While
beneficiaries owe greater duties to each other than do third parties dealing with the
trust, they do not occupy the same fiduciary position to the trust as does the trustee.
Thus, if the trustee sells trust property to a beneficiary of the trust, the sale is
voidable only if the price is unfair or the trustee had no authority to sell. 3 Scowr,
TRuSTS § 257A (2d ed. 1956). But cf. Headley v. Headley, 226 Ky. 483, 11 S.W.2d
123 (1928). While the beneficiaries may not be as well protected as third parties
in their dealings with the trust property, the protection which might be extended to
them as individual shareholders in a trustee-controlled corporation is a protection in
respect of their individual property. The acceptance of this argument seems implicit
in Dailey v. Wight, supra, when taken in the light of the fact that the position of the
immediate family of the trustee vis-i-vis the trust is not unlike the position of the
beneficiaries of the trust. See Strudthoff v. Yates, 162 P.2d 845, 851 (Cal. Dist Ct.
App. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 28 Cal. 2d 602, 170 P.2d 873 (1946) ; Tyler v.
Sanborn, 128 Ill. 136, 145, 21 N.E. 193, 195 (1889). Compare Noonan Estate, 361
Pa. 26, 63 A.2d 80 (1948); Yetzer Estate, 3 Fid. Rep. 469 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1952).
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v. Fry, resting as it does on the duty of the directors to minority
shareholders, would do little to protect a trustee who permitted the corporation to depart from the principles which govern the administration
of trust estates.
Furthermore, it seems clear that a trustee who holds all of the
outstanding shares of the corporation and who in fact has plenary control over its activities cannot contend, in an action by his beneficiaries,
that the decisions are made by the board of directors. In the first place,
some courts have implied that he has a duty to assume personal management of the corporation.5 Even though the better view is that this
duty arises only in special cases,5" there is no evidence at all that the
courts will accept a contention that the decisions are made by the
board when this is contrary to fact. The most that can be said is
that the courts are reluctant to enter an order against a shareholder
fiduciary, affecting the conduct of a corporation, unless the corporation
is made a party to the proceedings.' This, it will be recalled, was the
principal objection of the appellate court in Koretzky to the lower
court's decree ordering removal of the directors of warehouse company. The trustees in that case no longer owned all of the company's
outstanding capital stock. But it is interesting to note that the upper
court, after stating that the trustee's duty is to conduct the corporation
for the benefit of the trust, cited with approval Latorracav. Latorraca,4
which involved the duties of an executor who had received from the
decedent 100% of the capital stock of a wholesale grocery business,
51
In Elias v. Schweyer, 13 App. Div. 336, 340, 43 N.Y. Supp. 55, 58 (1897), the
court appeared to recognize such a duty, apparently without exception. In In re
Peabody's Estate, 218 Wis. 541, 547-48, 260 N.W. 444, 447 (1935), the duty is offered
as a rationale for allowing the trustee to retain compensation paid to him as a director
of the corporation. On this basis, cases which allow the trustee to retain such compensation tend to support the existence of such a duty. See Stone v. Baldwin, 348
I1l. App. 225, 238, 109 N.E.2d 244, 250-51 (1952), rev'd on other gromds, 414 Ill.
257, 111 N.E.2d 97 (1953); Wax v. Wax, 78 Pa. D. & C. 213 (C.P. 1951); Estate
of Teasdale, 261 Wis. 248, 52 N.W.2d 366 (1952). Cases which require the trustee to
account to the trust for such compensation tend to deny the existence of such a duty.
See, e.g., Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 173 Ad. 191 (1934); Pyle v. Pyle, 137
App. Div. 568, 122 N.Y. Supp. 256, aff'd, 199 N.Y. 538, 92 N.E. 538 (1910). Compare
Matter of Block, 186 Misc. 945, 60 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Surr. Ct. 1946). The trustee,
of course, has a duty not to delegate the administration of the trust, 2 Scor, TRusTs
§ 171 (2d ed. 1956), and there has been some question, based on this duty, whether
trustees may properly invest in regulated investment company shares, 3 id. § 227.9A.
52 Trachtman, Closely Held Businesses: Responsibilities of the Executor or Administrator,90 TRUSTS & EsTATEs 668, 674 (1951), concludes: "As a practical matter,
for the fiduciary to oust the management of a successful commercial enterprise, and
substitute untried hands, may be the height of imprudence. On the other hand, when
the business of the corporation was conducted by the decedent as the principal officer
and the other members of the board were only 'dummes'-there is a case for saying
that 5the fiduciary should put himself on the board."
3 Rossi v. Davis, 345 Mo. 362, 394, 133 S.W.2d 363, 380 (1939) ; Goetz's Estate
(No. 1), 236 Pa. 630, 633-34, 85 Atl. 65, 66 (1912). But cf. Wax v. Wax, 78 Pa.
D. & C. 213, 220 (C.P. 1951).
64 132 N.J. Eq. 40, 26 A.2d 522 (Ch. 1942).
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under a will which also contained a specific devise of land held by the
corporation. Notwithstanding that the corporation was not a party
defendant, the court not only ordered the executor "to cause the corporation to take such action as may be suitable to carry out the testator's intention in respect of the land" 5 but ordered him to conduct
the corporation in accordance with the provisions of the will. The will
directed that the capital committed to the business not exceed $80,000
and that the corporation pay dividends of 6% on such capital to the
trust annually." Cases requiring an executor to cause the corporation
to convey land which was specifically devised to another may be explained on the basis that a sole shareholder who has power to liquidate
a corporation may direct the executor to cause a partial liquidation, so
long as creditors are protected.7 But the court's order in Latorraca,
requiring the executor to adhere to a testamentary direction concerning
capital and dividends, cannot be explained on this basis. The direction
is a continuing harness on managerial discretion."8
Its enforcement against the executor suggests that a settlor who
conveys sole ownership to a trust may set the dividend policy of his
corporation through directions to the fiduciary. If this suggestion is
acceptable as a matter of corporate law, the trustee-owned corporation
is thrown open to the application of the principles we have found applied to the sole proprietorship held in trust." I believe, however, that
Latorracais not controlling and that an express direction to the fiduciary requiring him to distribute all the earnings of a corporation determined by "accepted" accounting practices would be invalid as a matter
of corporate law.
Clark v. Dodge,"0 the leading case on the permissible scope of
agreements among all of the shareholders of a corporation, contains an
interesting suggestion on this point. The agreement provided that
Dodge, who held 75 %' of the outstanding shares in two corporations,
would so vote as shareholder and as director as to retain Clark, who
held the remaining 25%o of the shares, as general manager so long as
he should be "faithful, efficient and competent." In addition, the agreement provided that Clark should receive during his lifetime one-fourth
of the "net income" of the corporations as salary or dividends. The
55 Id. at 42, 26 A.2d at 524.
ti Id. at 48, 26 A.2d at 527.
57

See Miles v. Odom, 3 N.J. Super. 376, 65 A.2d 754 (Ch. 1949) ; Fidelity Union

Trust Co. v. Roest, 113 N.J. Eq. 368, 375, 166 At. 918, 921 (Ch. 1933).

58 Compare Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 AtI. 568 (Ct. Err. & App.
1910), with the discussion of Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) in

text accompanying notes 60-65 infra.
59 See Krasnowiecld passin.

60 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
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court ordered specific performance of the agreement against Dodge and
the corporations-without paying attention to the fact that Dodge was
only one of a board of directors 61 , using oft-quoted language: "If the
enforcement of a particular contract damages nobody-not even, in any
perceptible degree, the public--one sees no reason for holding it illegal,
even though it impinges slightly upon the broad provision of .
[the state's corporation law] ." '

The negative of the last clause has, of course, been made pregnant
by later decisions of the same court.'
But the subsequent position of
the court, that substantial departures from the "corporate norm" are
not acceptable, even where nobody is injured, has been so severely
criticized by writers " that it is doubtful how far one might rely on
that position alone for guidance in other jurisdictions. From the point
of view of corporate lawyers, the subsequent history of Clark v. Dodge
is one of agreements affecting the personnel composition of management and, where dividends are involved, of agreements restricting distribution. Because of the peculiarity of trust law, however, we happen
to be interested principally in the validity of agreements requiring distribution of dividends. From this point of view, it is significant to note
that, in upholding the agreement that Clark should receive one-fourth
of the corporation's "net income," the court was impelled to state:
"For the purposes of this motion, it is only just to construe that phrase
as meaning whatever was left for distribution after the directors had
in good faith set aside whatever they deemed wise . ... 65
In Dejonge v. Zentgraf,6 6 an earlier decision, the court, while accepting the position that "all the stockholders in a private corporation
61
"Dodge took no active part in the business, although he was a director, and
through ownership of their qualifying shares, controlled the other directors of both
corporations."
Id. at 413, 199 N.E. at 641.
62
Id. at 415, 199 N.E. at 642. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 27 provides that "the

business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors .

.

.

."

Similar

provisions are to be found in most states. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:7-1 (1939);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-401 (1958).
6
See Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174,
77 N.E2d 633 (1948); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E2d
829 (1945). The New York development is traced in Delaney, mipra note 15, at 55-59.
64 See 1
'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.06, at 237 (1958) ; Delaney, supra note
15, at 65-66; Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 442 (1953); Comment, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 590 (1956).

"The

owners of 100% of the stock of a corporation may do with it as they will, even to
giving it away, provided the rights of creditors are not involved and the public policy
of the State is not offended." Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., supra note 63, at
124, 60 N.E.2d at 834 (Conway, J., dissenting). Accord, In re Feinson's Estate, 196
Misc. 590, 92 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Surr. Ct. 1949). The court in Baran v. Baran, 59 Pa.
D. & C. 556 (C.P. 1947), in adopting the view in Clark v. Dodge, does not appear
to state any limitation for departures from the "corporate norm." Instead, the court
said that such agreements remain valid so long as what the parties have contracted
to do they might do "lawfully," id. at 560-a limitation of undefined scope and significance.
65269 N.Y. at 417, 199 N.E. at 643.
66 182 App. Div. 43, 169 N.Y. Supp. 377 (1918).
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can contract among themselves and with the company to control the
action of directors in managing the affairs of the company, so long as
such control violates no law and does not impair the rights of creditors,"
seriously doubted that an agreement requiring the distribution of all the
company's earnings could be sustained. 7 It preferred to interpret the
agreement before it, as did the court in Clark v. Dodge, to permit the
directors to set aside whatever is needed. In support of this the court
stated that "an interpretation which compels the directors to distribute
all profits would be .

. subversive of the company's best interests,

and, as could easily be foreseen, would probably lead to bankruptcy
It is reassuring to find that the court in Dejonge foresaw what I
have argued in Part I of this article is the fate of a business run in
accordance with the rules of trust administration. A great many corporation statutes contain, in addition to or in lieu of prohibitions against
capital impairment, dividend provisions rendering illegal dividends declared "when the corporation is insolvent or when payment thereof
would render the corporation insolvent." 69 It would be hard to argue
that a shareholder agreement requiring the distribution of all the earnings legally available for dividends is violative of these provisions as to
any year or any series of years." Such distributions need not lead to
But because, as the court in Dejonge saw, bankruptcy
bankruptcy.
is probable and this probability is manifestly increased in an era of
rapid obsolescence and inflation 7 "-at least for enterprises whose capital
is a substantial income-producing factor-it may be argued that such
contracts are invalid because they tend toward a violation of the dividend law and tend to impair the rights of creditors.
I am not unmindful of the authorities which sustain mandatory
contractual provisions requiring distribution of dividends to noncumulative preferred shareholders if there are any earnings available for this
purpose.72 But these cases, I believe, should be sharply distinguished
67 Id. at 47, 169 N.Y. Supp. at 378-79. The court relied on Drucklieb v. Sam H.
Harris, Inc., 209 N.Y. 211, 102 N.E. 599 (1913). Now, Lindgrove v. Schluter & Co.,
256 N.Y. 439, 444, 176 N.E. 832, 833 (1931), lends support to the court's doubts.
68 182 App. Div. at 48, 169 N.Y. Supp. at 380.
69 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-702A (1958).
70 The few cases on the subject suggest that the courts are extremely reluctant
to find a causal relationship between the distribution and a subsequent insolvency
(where the distribution did not impair capital).

See Hofkin v. United States Smelting

Co., 266 Fed. 679 (3d Cir. 1920); Ellis v. French-Canadian Co-op. Ass'n, 189 Mass.
566, 76 N.E. 207 (1905) ; Slaymaker's Adm'r v. Jaffray & Co., 82 Va. 346, 4 S.E.
606 (1887).
71 See articles cited note 32 supra.
72 See Burk v. Ottawa Gas & Elec. Co., 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857 (1912) ; Crocker
v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N.E.2d 230 (1944); cf. New England
Trust Co. v. Penobscot Chem. Fibre Co., 142 Me. 286, 50 A.2d 188 (1946). But see
Morse v. Boston & M.R.R., 263 Mass. 308, 160 N.E. 894 (1928), a case erroneously
distinguished in Crocker.
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from our case. They involve preferred stock entitled to dividends in a
specified percentage-normally 6%. Business enterprises in general
may be expected to maintain a level of earnings greater than the average
rate of interest. Nor does the preferred stock normally represent the
major portion of a corporation's capitalization. Recognition of mandatory dividend provisions in respect of preferred stock is not authority
for the validity of a shareholder contract or bylaw requiring the distribution of all the earnings of a company. The latter necessarily denies
to management any right to make provision for the survival of the
enterprise whereas the former does not. In fact, in Crocker v. Waltham
Watch Co., 73 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, sustaining
the validity of a mandatory dividend provision in respect of 6% noncumulative preferred, rested its decision squarely on this distinction.
It is therefore inappropriate, though common,74 to cite cases 71,suggesting that a shareholder contract or bylaw requiring the distribution of
all earnings is invalid, as opposed to the preferred shareholder cases.
Neither line of authority impairs the other. If this point be acceptable,
it is interesting to note that Latorraca fits in part into the distinction
suggested, since in that case the settlor merely directed a distribution
of 6%. on the capital of his corporation-if the earnings would
76
support it.
Perhaps the best that can be said is that there is enough support
in corporate law for the view that contracts requiring the disbursement
of all of a corporation's earnings are invalid to furnish a useful argument to the trustee who, owning all of the shares of a corporation, is
pressed to distribute more than he believes healthy for the enterprise.
B. The Cases in the Trust Field
It should be made clear at this point that the cases in this field,
on the whole, do not support the view that the courts are willing to
apply trust administration rules to a wholly trustee-owned corporation.
But an examination of the cases does reveal a marked confusion and a
failure on the part of the courts to arrive at a sound, clear-cut position.
In every field of argument there is one case which helps to illustrate
73

74

315 Mass. 397, 409-10, 53 N.E.2d 230, 236-37 (1944).
See 12 FLETCHlER, PRIVATE CoRPoRATIoNs § 5447.1 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1957).

15 See,

(1931)

e.g., Lindgrove v. Schluter & Co., 256 N.Y. 439, 444, 176 N.E. 832, 833

(dictum).

76 Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 30 N.E.2d 482 (1939),
often cited for the validity of bylaw and contractual provisions requiring the distribution of earnings, involved a bylaw which required distribution of earnings in
excess of a net surplus of $1,000,000. It is hardly authority for a bylaw or contract
prohibiting the creation of any surplus.
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the horrors of a world in which one's argument is not heeded. Here,
such a case is Matter of Estate of Adler."
Some years before his death, Samuel Adler organized Relda Realty
Corporation for the purpose of acquiring land and erecting thereon a
twelve-story building for commercial rental. Adler was the owner of
the entire capital stock which he left by his will to trustees, directing
them to continue the business. The income of the trust was payable
to certain beneficiaries during their lives, the remainder to others.
When Adler died in 1927, the land and building, valued at $865,000,
were subject to a first mortgage of $325,000, and the corporation's
books carried an account in Adler's name which showed a credit balance in his favor of $128,507.75. The directors authorized the corporation to discharge this debt out of earnings, and between 1927 and
the time of suit, the corporation paid $103,507.75 to the trustees of
Adler's estate. The corporation had also built up reserves of $88,000
against depreciation and payment of the principal on the mortgage.
Some of the current income beneficiaries brought an action challenging both the trustees' right to retain the payments made on account
of the debt owed the testator and the validity of the reserves created
by the corporation. The surrogate held that retention by the trustees
of the amounts paid in discharge of the debt constituted an invalid
accumulation of income.7 s To reach this result, he had to-and diddisregard the corporate entity, view the assets and debts of the corporation as assets and debts of the trust, and apply the well-known trust
rule that the principal on debts owed by a trust must be paid out of
principal."9 Lip to this point, there was no need to reverse the corporate actions taken, since only the character of the payments received
by the trustee was at issue. The surrogate, however, went further.
He held that a trustee may not set up reserves against depreciation and
ordered that the corporate action in this regard be reversed."' The
trustees argued vainly that the reserves were needed to discharge the
principal of the mortgage on the corporate building. The surrogate
answered that had the settlor left the land and building in trust and
directed that the mortgage be discharged out of income, the direction
would have been invalid as requiring an unlawful accumulation of income. 81 No different principle, in the opinion of the surrogate, could
be applicable to a corporation wholly owned by the trustee.
77164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937).

78 See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1915, ch. 670, § 2, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959,
ch. 453, § 1 (now N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 16).
79 See 3 ScoTT, TRUsTs § 233.3, at 1756 (2d ed. 1956).
80 164 Misc. at 548, 556-57, 229 N.Y. Supp. at 558-59. The prohibition against
for depreciation is discussed in Krasnowiecdi 529-32.
reserves
81
See Hascall v. King, 162 N.Y. 134, 56 N.E. 515 (1900) ; Krasnowiecld 547-48.
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Adler has not been expressly overruled by a higher New York
court. But in an interesting recent decision, Freeman v. FarmersBank
& Trust Co.,8 the Supreme Court of Arkansas had occasion to consider and distinguish it. There, the decedent left all of the capital stock
of an incorporated farm to a trustee, directing him to control and manage it and to pay the income to the plaintiff for life with gifts over.
The farm was subject to a mortgage of $200,000. For various reasons,
including tax considerations, the trustee, with the consent of all concerned, dissolved the corporation and continued to operate the farm
in sole proprietorship. At this point, the income beneficiary of the
trust brought this action challenging the trustee's right to amortize the
mortgage out of current income. The court held that the normal rule
of trust administration-requiring that the principal on debts of the
trust estate be amortized out of principal-was displaced by a manifestation of a contrary intention on the part of the testator. The court
found this intention in the fact that the farm was left incorporated and
that the settlor must have been aware that corporations may not declare
dividends until current obligations are paid.' The court distinguished
Adler on the ground that there the then-existing New York rule against
accumulations was involved.'
In connection with Freeman it should be observed that by a combination of good sense and the inexorable logic of the corporate balance
sheet, current earnings used in the reduction of the principal of a corporate obligation do not vanish but, instead, find their way into the
corporate surplus. So that the critical question in Freeman was not (as
the court supposed) whether the settlor may be said to have intended
that the corporation pay its debts but rather whether he may be said
to have intended that every reduction in its liabilities be attended by a
corresponding contraction in his business. The Freeman court's apparent reluctance to embrace the obvious answer to this question without some reference to an irrelevant point of corporate dividend law is
fairly discouraging for the view that it rejects the Adler philosophy
out of hand. At least, under this decision, the trustee-owned corporation is put in a better position for borrowing than is the sole proprietorship."5
Furthermore, the surrogate's views on depreciation reserves appear
to have lost all their force. As we have seen, the trust rule against
depreciation reserves was strongest in New York in connection with
82 339 S.W.2d
83 Id. at 429,

427 (Ark. 1960).
citing 11 FLETcH,

repl. 1957).
84 339 S.W.2d at 429.

85 See Krasnowiecki 519.
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real estate.86 After some hesitation, the New York Court of Appeals
has approved such reserves for wholly trust-owned real estate corporations,"' and, in general, courts now seem ready to approve depreciation by trustees on assets used in business."' Moreover, the weight of
opinion, based on a number of inconclusive cases, is that dividends to
the full amount of surplus, without provision for depreciation, would
constitute an impairment of capital.89
How much then is left of Adler? On this question there are cases
which may be given optimistic construction, but one can hardly say
that they present a firm position. Perhaps the clearest and soundest
position was taken by a Massachusetts court in Anderson v. Bean,90
a case antedating Adler. There, the testator left half of the outstanding capital stock of a corporation engaged in manufacturing electrical
appliances to a trustee who owned the remaining stock in his own
right. Upon an accounting by the trustee, objection was made to the
fact that the trustee permitted the accumulation of $400,000 surplus in
relation to $200,000 capital. In his defense the trustee prayed in aid
the philosophy of the Massachusetts rule as to stock dividends. This
rule rested on a relatively unreasoned assertion that the income of a
corporation is not income of the beneficiary." The beneficiaries contended, however, that this philosophy is inapplicable when the trustee
holds all of the corporation's capital stock. The court rejected the
beneficiaries' claim against the trustee. Had the court simply reiterated
the sterile proposition that income of the corporation is not income of
the trust its decision would have left something to be desired. However, the court went to the heart of the problem, stating that the dividends actually distributed to the beneficiaries were probably "enhanced
8

6See Krasnowiecki 532 nn.104 & 105.
See Matter of City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 306 N.Y. 733, 117 N.E.2d 910

87

(1954)

(approval per curiam) ; Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 257, 97 N.E.2d

888, 893 (1951)

(refusal to pass on question). But cf. Rossi v. Davis, 345 Mo. 362,

390, 133 S.W.2d 363, 378 (1939) (trustees willing to discontinue reserves).
88 See Krasnowiecki 532 n.109.
8
s FIxNx & Mn.Lua, Pmx'ci'Las op AccOUNTING,-INTRMEDIATE 356 (5th ed.
1958) ; see People ex rel. Jamaica Water Supply Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Coxnm'rs,
128 App. Div. 13, 17, 112 N.Y. Supp. 392 , 395 (1908), mnodified, 196 N.Y. 39, 57-58,
89 N.E. 581, 586 (1909) ; Pardee v. Hardwood Elec. Co., 262 Pa. 68, 105 AtI. 48
(1918). Other cases are reviewed in Fitts, Relation of Depreciation to the Determination of Surpht and Earnings Available for Dividends, 33 VA. L. REv. 581 (1947).
90 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647 (1930).
91 The leading Massachusetts decision of Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868),
is the source of the "Massachusetts" rule that all stock dividends go to corpus. The
court there confined itself to the following propositions: (1) that since improvement
made by directors out of earnings would constitute capital and would inure to the
benefit of the remainderman if there had been no stock dividend, the accident of a
stock dividend should not change matters; (2) that shareholders have no clear claim
to the earnings of a corporation until a dividend is declared; and (3) that the "trustee
needs some plain principle to guide him." Id. at 107, 108. Except for the last proposition, these are somewhat circular reasons for the adoption of the rule.
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by the surplus accumulated above what they would have been if the
earnings had been distributed in dividends year by year." 92 Nevertheless, this basis for the decision does not aid the trustee when the situation is such that distribution of the earnings will result in a higher
level of income during the period of the trust, leaving at the end an
enterprise which is fit for the scrap heap. Moreover, Anderson v. Bean
is a special case in that the trust was to continue only until the trustee
decided "to retire from the management of the business," at which time
the corpus was to be distributed to the current income beneficiaries in
the same proportions as they were entitled to income. Accumulation
of surplus could not, therefore, be as decisive an economic blow to them
as in the case of a gift over to others.
Optimistic views are often taken of Boyle v. John Boyle & Co. 3
This again is an ambiguous, not to say curious, case. The plaintiffs
were three trustees of a trust holding all of the capital stock of the corporation and also directors of the corporation. There appear to have
been three other directors. The action was against the corporation
seeking distribution of a surplus of $80,045.79 accumulated during the
years 1907 and 1908. No dividends were declared during these years,
but the settlor appears to have expected this, for he provided that if
the company failed to pay a dividend of at least 5 % per annum for
three consecutive years, the stock should be sold. The lower court
ordered the distribution sought. The appellate court, finding that the
distribution would have imperiled the enterprise during the "embarrassing times of 1907 and 1908," reversed.' Although the court also
stated that the testator must be presumed to have intended that the corporation be run like a corporation, 5 the context does not encourage the
view that a trustee is justified in holding back more income than is
absolutely necessary to save the corporation from immediate disaster. 6
92 272 Mass. at 445, 172 N.E. at 650.
93 136 App. Div. 367, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1048 (1910) ; see Calm, Estate Corporatims,

86 U. PA. L. REv. 136, 142-43 (1937).
94 136 App. Div. at 370, 120 N.Y. Supp. at 1051.
95 Id.at 371, 120 N.Y. Supp. at 1052. It might be noted that the court was not
sure whether the surplus represented profits or resulted from writeups in the value
of existing assets. Such revaluation should find its way into capital surplus account.
New York is one of the few states in which dividends may be distributed on the basis
of unrealized appreciation of fixed assets. See Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 43
N.E.2d 43 (1942). Compare Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52
A.2d 571 (1947). PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 2852-702A (1) (1958) provides that dividends may be paid "only out of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus." On
the problem created in New York in connection with stock dividends, see In re Terehune, 50 N.J. Super. 414, 142 A.2d 684 (Super. Ct. 1958); It re Bingham's Will,
7 N.Y.2d 1, 163 N.E.2d 301, 194 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1959).
96 In Matter of Doelger, 254 App. Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd enem., 279 N.Y.
646, 18 N.E.2d 42 (1938), the testator left a brewing business to trustees in sole
proprietorship, directing them to incorporate and to adopt certain bylaws. Among
other things, the bylaws were to provide that the corporation might invest proceeds

from the sale of its real estate only in investments on the legal list. The trustees
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Two Pennsylvania cases are often cited for the proposition that a
settlor, sole owner of a corporation whose shares he transfers in trust,
may not dictate in the trust instrument the dividend policies to be followed by the corporation. On close examination, however, those cases
offer less than adequate encouragement to the trustee who, in the exercise of his honest judgment, would permit such a corporation to retain
some of its earnings.
In Green v. Philadelphia.Inquirer Co.,97 the plaintiff, John Green,
was not a life beneficiary of a trust. His claim against the company
was that he had succeeded under the will of his sister-in-law to all the
rights to which she had succeeded under the will of her husband, James
Elverson, Jr.; that James Elverson, Jr., was a life income beneficiary
of a trust which owned all of the shares of the Inquirer; and that, in
spite of the fact that James Elverson, Jr., was the sole trustee of the
trust and made no claim to larger distributions, the plaintiff was entitled to all of the surplus of the corporation which should have been
distributed to James Elverson, Jr. It is hard to find a more fantastic
claim. The plaintiff also presented a similar claim as to the surplus
accumulated during the life of the mother of James Elverson, Jr., who,
under the will of her husband, was a sole legal life tenant of all of the
shares of the Inquirer until her death. In connection with this claim
the plaintiff had to trace his right through his sister-in-law to her
husband and through him to his mother who was, as was her son after
her, quite content with the dividend policy of the Inquirer. Green's
complaint against the corporation was dismissed as, indeed, it should
have been. He was neither a shareholder of the corporation at the
time of the suit, nor a beneficiary of a trust holding shares in the corporation. His only claim to the corporate surplus must have rested,
therefore, on the theory that the possible claim of the life beneficiaries,
incorporated and adopted the bylaws specified. With the advent of national prohibition,
the trustees caused the corporation to sell the brewing assets and to reinvest in real
estate. The beneficiaries sought to surcharge the trustees for certain investments
made by the corporation-concededly out of the proceeds of personalty. The surrogate
allowed the claim, despite the fact that some of the shares of the corporation had been
distributed to the corpus beneficiaries. Matter of Doelger, 164 Misc. 590, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 565 (Surr. Ct. 1937). Compare discussion in note 50 supra. The appellate
division reversed. Because the testator made express provision for real estate owned
by the corporation (in the bylaws), the court found an implicit intention on his part
that the legal-list requirement should not apply to proceeds of personalty. Despite
broad language in the opinion to the effect that a settlor must be taken to have intended the corporation to possess its normal powers, the case obviously rests on a
subtle application of the maxim expressio imius (as to real estate) est exchlsio alterius
(as to personalty). If anything, it supports the view that the settler may provide
what he will concerning the investments of a wholly owned corporation. On the
extent to which the rules of trust administration may be applicable to a trustee-owned
corporation, the law of New York continues to be uncertain. See Matter of Shupack,
1 N.Y.2d 482, 136 N.E.2d 513, 154 N.Y.S.2d 441, reversing 1 App. Div. 2d 841, 149
N.Y.S.2d 20 (1956).
97 329 Pa. 169, 196 AtI. 32 (1938).
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a claim they. did not enforce, was a property interest of the kind which
would pass under the wills of the life tenants; that those who took under
the wills could pass it on to others; and that such others could assign
the rights to Green.
In affirming the decree dismissing the complaint, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania stressed the point that plaintiff could not assert
against the corporation a claim of life beneficiaries now deceased which
was not asserted by the beneficiaries during their lifetime." However,
it went on to state that James Elverson, Sr., the original testator, "did
not direct that all of the net earnings should be paid out in dividends,
nor was there any such intention on his part. Furthermore, it is clear
that James Elverson, Sr., had no power, even had he so intended, to
dictate by will the dividend policy of the corporation of which he was
the sole stockholder." "
The position that a testator, sole stockholder of a corporation,
may not dictate anything at all to his fiduciary concerning the conduct of
the enterprise is hardly tenable today. It has been argued earlier that he
may validly dictate as much but not more than what would be acceptable as a valid subject matter of unanimous shareholder agreement. In
this connection it is interesting to note the recent case of Scholler
Trust.10 0 In 1939, the settlor, the sole owner of all the capital stock
of three corporations (with the exception of qualifying shares of the
directorate), created the Scholler Foundation by an inter vivos deed of
trust. To the trustees he transferred all of his stock in the three corporations. Certain heirs of the settlor brought the action for a declaration that the Foundation was not a charity and therefore invalid
under the rule against perpetuities. Among the contentions made by
the heirs were that certain provisions of the trust deed governing the
conduct of the corporations were in violation of corporate law and
were contrary to public policy, and that the vice of these provisions
infected the character of the trust sufficiently to prevent it from being
charitable. The trust deed contained covenants on the part of the
trustees binding them in considerable detail on matters involving the
conduct of the corporations. The trustees undertook to vote their
stock in favor of the election as directors of persons nominated by
the then board of directors, provided that the nominations were
made in good faith. Furthermore, they undertook to vote the stock
"to the end that [the settlor and his sister, Ida M. Scholler] continue
as directors of said corporations for life." Increases in officers' salaries
98 Id. at 174, 196 AtI. at 34.

99 id. dt 175, 196 AtI. at 34.
100 403 Pa. 97, 169 A.2d 554 (1961).

1962]

TRUSTEE-CONTROLLED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE

839

were to be made subject to approval by the trustees. The trustees
covenanted that the directors would set aside out of the net earnings
of the corporations an amount determined to be necessary "for purposes of expansion or other form of capital outlay," and that they
would then set aside $4.00 per share to be paid out as dividends before
any bonuses could be paid.1" 1 There were detailed covenants concerning the bonuses.
The position taken by the trustees and by the state attorney general
as parens patriaewas that if there was any vice in this provision of the
trust deed it did not impair the charitable character of the trust. With
this, the Pennsylvania courts, I believe quite properly, agreed. It is
interesting to note, however, that on exceptions to the adjudication of
the orphans' court, Judge Bolger stated: "In her brief, the Deputy
Attorney General, as parens patriaefor charitable trusts, expresses this
view [that the vices of the instrument were of no effect on the charitable aspect of the trust] and declares her intention to test these provisions in due course in appropriate proceedings." 102 When this matter
is litigated, I very much doubt that the near dictum in Green v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co. will be vindicated.'es
For its position that the settlor has no power at all to dictate the
dividend policy of a trustee-owned corporation, the court in Green
relied on Goetz's Estate (No. 1). 104 This case is an enigma. The
testator left his entire estate to his executors in trust to pay the income
to his wife for life with remainders over. He died a partner in a tanning business. The executor, with the consent of the beneficiaries,
purchased the interest of the surviving partner and incorporated the
business. Except for the qualifying shares, all the stock was issued to
the trustees. For five years the corporation paid no dividends at all.
On an accounting by the executors, to which the corporation was not
made a party, the orphans' court determined the profits of the corporation for that period ($171,144.02) and ordered them distributed to
the widow. This order was reversed by the supreme court. There
appear to have been two possible grounds for the court's action. First,
the court objected that the orphans' court had no jurisdiction to enter
101 Brief for Appellant, p. 7, Scholler Trust, 403 Pa. 97, 169 A.2d 554 (1961).
0
SCholler Estate, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 318, 333 (Orphans' Ct. 1960).
Since the decision in Green, there has been a marked shift of opinion in favor
of shareholder agreements in closely held corporations. See note 64 vipra; Ballard,
Arrmtgelnents For Participationin Corporate Management Under the Pennsylvania
Business Corporation Law, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 131 (1951). If the Scholler covenants
do not exceed the tolerance of the corporate norm, the charitable character of the
foundation may then well be questioned. It is one thing to accept foundation control
of business enterprises, it is another to provide a vehicle for the perpetuation of the
founder's business policies. See generally SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND (1955).
104 236 Pa. 630, 85 Atl. 65 (1912).
1 2
103
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. company." 105

This

objection is obviously sound. Computation of earnings is a difficult
matter on which the court should have given corporate management a
chance to speak. Furthermore, an order requiring distribution of all
of the earnings, I have argued, affects the rights of creditors, and the
corporation should be made a party to afford them some degree of
notice of what is afoot. However, the court went on to state a second
ground for its decision: "The affairs of a corporation are managed by
a board of directors, who, in the first instance, are to determine whether
profits have been earned and whether, in their discretion, they ought to
be divided among the shareholders; and, if such discretion is abused,
the remedy for its correction is not to be found in an Orphans'
Court." 100

The orphans' courts of Pennsylvania are, of course, courts of limited jurisdiction. Prior to 1917, they did not have, as they have had
since that date, exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of testamentary trusts.0 7 Speaking in 1912, the court in Goetz, in stating that
the orphans' courts had no power to enter an order against the executortrustee affecting the conduct of a wholly owned corporation may have
meant merely that such an order was solely within the competence of a
court of general jurisdiction. The quoted language, however, suggests
that the court believed that such an order would be an improper one for
any court to enter and that the current income beneficiary's only remedy would be to bring, or to cause his trustee to bring, an ordinary
shareholders' suit for the declaration of dividends-a suit which would
be subject to the normal rule that the directors' discretion will not be
questioned unless plainly abused. Such a limited view of the equitable
jurisdiction of the courts would certainly make it impossible for any
court to enter a decree of the sort which was entered by the New
08
Jersey chancery court in Latorraca.1
If this is the conclusion to be drawn from Goetz, it would appear
that the orphans' courts, which now have exclusive jurisdiction of both
testamentary and inter vivos trusts, could not even order a trustee removed when the complaint against him was that he, as sole shareholder
of a corporation, had failed to secure distribution of any dividends
although the corporation could readily pay them. It is hard to believe
that the reach of equity could be so circumscribed by technicalities. 10 9
Moreover, if the court in Goetz held this view, it is difficult to explain
105 Id. at 634, 85 AtI. at 66.
106 Id. at 635, 85 At. at 67.

107 See Orphans' Court Act of 1951, § 301, as amended, PA.
§2080.301(2) (Supp. 1961):
108 See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
109 Cf. Freihofer Estate, 405 Pa. 165, 174 A.2d 282 (1961).

STAT. ANN. tit.

20,
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its soothing assurance that "if profits have been earned by the . .
company, to which the widow of the testator is entitled through divi10
dends paid, or to be paid, to his executors, she will receive them."'
It is hard to say that these cases assure the trustee of protection
if he determines that some income must be retained in the business.
The grounds upon which these cases appear to rest-that a sole owner
of the corporation has no power at all to direct his trustee on the manner of its operation, or that (in theory) the decisions are made by the
board of directors-are probably untenable today.
I have argued here that for the protection of the trustee we must
look, in the first instance, to the cases dealing with the power of shareholders and directors to agree on matters involving the conduct of the
corporation. This approach was taken on the theory that no court
would be justified in overstepping the line drawn in those cases to
subject the trustee to liability for failing to follow the express or implied
provisions of the trust agreement. But in those cases, as we have seen,
a sharp distinction is drawn between agreements involving all of the
shareholders and agreements involving less than all. Although not
supported by the New York cases, the opinion of most authorities is
that all of the shareholders of a corporation may do what they please
with it so long as creditors are not injured. This would leave the
trustee who owns all of the shares of a corporation unprotected by the
suggested approach-unless an argument can be made that to require
him to distribute all of the earnings impairs the rights of creditors.
That the existing state of the law should lead me to pursue a hairline distinction between the position of the trustee who does not own
all of the outstanding shares of the corporation and one who owns all
of the shares may suggest some weakness in my analysis. I hope,
however, that it also suggests some absurdity in the existing law. It
may be that the trustee who happens to own all of the outstanding
shares of a corporation is as well shielded from the application of the
normal rules of trust administration in the conduct of corporate affairs
as is the trustee who happens to own less than all. But if this is so, I
have failed to find the shield. Perhaps it is secreted in the interstices
of procedure, or locked in the good-natured bosom of most beneficiaries,
or found in the quiet persuasiveness of competent trustees. It is not
11
to be discovered in the cases.'

III.

TAX PROBLEMS AND THE TRUST INSTRUMENT

To relieve possible pressure for improvident distributions, a clause
giving the trustee broad discretion in the conduct of the business may
i10 Goetz's Estate (No. 1), 236 Pa. 630, 636, 85 AtI. 65, 67 (1912).
'l See note 49 supra.
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be helpful."' Although one cannot be certain what interpretation the
courts might give to such a clause in any particular case, it has an advantage from the tax viewpoint over a clause which makes specific
reference to the retention of earnings in the corporation. If the trust
is sought to be qualified for the life-estate-with-testamentary-power-ofappointment marital deduction, a clause authorizing the trustee to retain earnings in the corporation may be fatal."
If the marital deduction is not involved, the settlor may wish to
give more specific directions concerning the financial policy of the corporation. I have argued that directions to the trustee affecting the
conduct of a corporation should be given effect to the same extent as,
but no greater than, that given to agreements between shareholders
involving the same matters. In determining what directions may appropriately be given to the trustee, the authorities dealing with shareholder agreements should be more carefully considered than was possible in this article." 4 It seems clear, however, that the sole owner
of a corporation may validly direct his trustee to cause distributions
of a fixed percentage on the net assets of the business, if earnings will
support it." 5 I would argue that if this percentage exceeds the normal
return on preferred stock the direction should be held invalid-as should
a direction to distribute all of the earnings.
Alternatively, the sole owner of a corporation may direct that a
specific percentage of the earnings be retained in surplus and that the
balance be distributed." 6 D'Arcangelo suggests, and the cases following Clark v. Dodge support the validity of directions requiring the employment of family members by the corporation when the trustee is
given all of the shares in the corporation." 7 Directions requiring the
112 See Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 445, 172 N.E. 647, 653 (1930).

See Krasnowiecld 546-47.
L4 See generally 1 'NEAL, CLOSE CoanoR&inoNs §§ 5.01-.39 (1958).
"15 See note 72 supra; Latorraca v. Latorraca, 132 N.J. Eq. 40, 48, 26 A.2d 522,
527 (Ch. 1942), aff'd mene., 133 N.J. Eq. 298, 31 A.2d 819 (Ct Err. & App. 1943).
116 Lydia F. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 11-14, 20 N.E.2d 482,
489-91 (1939) ; In re Trust Under Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 218-20, 15 N.W.2d
590, 597-98 (1944). The latter case, however, rested partly on the fact that the direction pertained to assets donated to the corporation by the testator, the court holding
that the direction must be followed or the assets returned by the corporation.
117 See discussion of D'Arcangelo in text accompanying notes 11-14 supra;
Matter of Will of Feinson, 196 Misc. 590, 92 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Surr. Ct. 1949); In re
Trust Under Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 216-18, 15 N.W.2d 590, 596-97
(1944) (direction that testator's widow be employed as an officer and voted a salary
of $3,600 upheld, although she was dead at time of suit); cf. Boyle v. John Boyle &
Co., 136 App. Div. 367, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1048 (1910), affd mem., 200 N.Y. 597, 94
N.E. 1092 (1911); Edson v. Norristown-Penn Trust Co., 359 Pa. 386, 59 A.2d 82
"13

(1948).

See generally O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRpoRAoNs, § 5.17 (1958).

None of these cases, however, involved the question whether the person designated by the settlor to be elected, employed, or continued in office with the corporation
has any right to enforce the provisions of the trust instrument. In D'Arcangelo the
court stated in dictum that a direction to cause a wholly owned corporation to employ
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trustee to vote for certain individuals as directors, if they are persons
whose competence cannot be questioned, would appear to be valid even
when the trustee holds less than all of the shares."1 8 It should be noted
that employment of family members by the corporation, if the com9
pensation is reasonable and justifiable as a business expense," is a
useful device for reducing the double tax factor present in the taxation
of small corporations.
If the settlor's main fear is that the current income beneficiary of
the trust may not be adequately protected, particularly in the light of
cases such as Green and Goetz, the facts of a recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Austin
Givens, Inc.," ° suggest an approach which should be used with great
caution, if at all. Shortly after the death of Austin Givens, his widow
and her five sons incorporated the decedent's business, pursuant to an
agreement approved by the orphans' court as part of the settlement of
his estate. The five sons placed the common stock issued to them in
trust, appointing their mother as trustee and making the income payable to her for life. By the terms of the trust instrument, the mother
was to continue as chairman of the board of directors and to have
"complete control over the affairs of the corporation." In addition,
she was given the power, in her sole discretion, to determine the dividend policy of the corporation. During her lifetime, the corporation
paid no dividends; she wrote a letter explaining to her sons that it was
her intention that the earnings retained by the corporation be theirs as
corpus beneficiaries of the trust. Upon the death of the mother, her
administrator c.t.a. brought the present action claiming that the corporate surplus belonged to her estate. The court, stressing the letter
a designated person may be "enforced"-but it does not state by whom. In Feinson,

upon a petition for instructions filed by the executor-trustee, the court, while holding
the direction valid, noted that it is not called upon to enforce the obligation. A
holding that the settlor's direction in the matter is valid under corporate law does
not dispose of the question whether the designated prospective employee or officer
may sue the trustee. Indeed, directions in a will or trust instrument to employ a
designated person as attorney in matters involving the estate or trust are obviously
valid but are generally held unenforceable by the attorney. See Note, Testamentary
Designation of an Attorney, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 322. The courts here draw the distinction between directions to employ which evidence merely an intention to guide the
trustee in the exercise of his discretion and directions which are intended to give a
beneficial interest to the prospective employee. It seems clear that the courts are
reluctant to find an intention of the latter sort. It may be that if the prospective
employee is a close member of the settlor's family or is a trusted old friend, skilled in
the work intended for him, such an intention will be found to exist. See Hand Estate,
349 Pa. 111, 36 A.2d 485 (1944) ; Will of Platt, 205 Wis. 290, 237 N.W. 109 (1931) ;
2 ScoTT, TRuSTS § 126.3 (2d ed. 1956). Discussion of this question is perhaps unrealistic since, if the direction is valid and the designated employee competent, the
trustee is better protected in following the direction. See Will of Platt, spra. It
may, however, be wise to spell out the settlor's intention in the matter at some length.
118 See generally O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.12 (1958).
119 See INT. Rxv. CoD- oF 1954, § 162(a).
120399 Pa. 649, 161 A.2d 10 (1960).
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to the sons, held that the administrator's claim must fail because the
mother, knowing of her rights to the surplus intentionally failed to
exercise them."2 It is interesting to note that the court avoided stating
that the mother made a gift of the earnings; nor did the court say, as it
might have if Green and Goetz were given their broadest interpretation,
that the provisions of the trust instrument giving the mother sole right
to determine what earnings should be distributed as dividends were
invalid and that, therefore, she had no more right to the earnings than
any other life beneficiary of a trust whose trustee holds all of the shares
of the corporation. Thus, at least inferentially, the opinion of the
court suggests that a settlor-sole-owner of a corporation may give to
the current income beneficiary of a trust the powers over the corporate
earnings possessed by the mother in this case.
But the vesting of such a power in the life income beneficiary of
the trust, if valid and enforceable as a matter of local law, may be extremely unwise from the tax viewpoint. The power is a general power
of appointment over the corporate surplus causing a corresponding
part of the value of the business to pass through the life beneficiary's
Howgross estate," unless the power is disclaimed or renounced.'ever, if the power is an annual noncumulative power restricted so as to
qualify under the $5,000 or 5%, rule of sections 2041(b) (2) and
2514(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, no adverse estate or
gift tax consequences will be incurred. It should be noted that the
exceptions of these provisions are not to be found in section 678,12
which taxes income to the beneficiary of a trust when the beneficiary
has a power, exercisable solely by himself, to vest the income or the
income-producing property in himself. While section 678 is in terms
applicable to the income or assets of a trust, it would not seem possible
to argue for a different result when, as in our case, the power is over
the income of a corporation whose stock is owned solely by the trust.12 5
If the income beneficiary of the trust is given a power to determine what amount of the current earnings of a corporation shall be
distributed in dividends-rather than a power over all of the surplus
121 Id. at 654-56, 161 A.2d at 12.
See INT. REV. CoDS oF 1954, § 2041.

122

Compare Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b) (1)

(1961).
12 3 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(a) (2) ; Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d) (6)
(1954).
For the corresponding gift tax provision, see INT. REV. CoDE. OF 1954,
§2514(b) ; Treas. Reg. §25.2514-3(c) (5) (1958).
124 Such an exception was suggested in Hearings on Recommendations of the
Advisory Group on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code Before

the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 298-99 (1959).
However, it was dropped from the committee version of these recommendations.
See H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 109 (1960).
125 Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-431, 1956-2 Cum. BuL. 171.
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or a power confined to a noncumulative right to $5,000 (or 5% on the
value of the assets) annually-the tax problems seem even more acute.
Such a power will cause a fraction of the value of the business existing
at the death of the income beneficiary, computed by reference to the
amounts by which the earnings retained by the corporation in any
year in which they were subject to the power exceeded the $5,000 or
5% limitations of section 2041 (b) (2),1"6 to be included in the gross

estate of the income beneficiary. Furthermore, during his lifetime, the
latter amounts retained by the corporation in any one year would appear
to be subject to the gift tax, unless it can be shown that in permitting
the retention of earnings, the life tenant was actuated by business considerations rather than by the intention to benefit the members of his
family who are corpus beneficiaries of the trust.1 2 7 There is support

for the view that the gift here would be a gift to the shareholders
rather than to the corporation and that, especially where the ultimate
donees are future beneficiaries of the trust corpus, the gift is of future
interests thus not entitled to the annual exclusion of section 2503 (b)
of the Code.'-2
The gift tax questions should serve as a warning to trustees who,
pressed by the fear of later objections to their dividend policy, rely on
written consent obtained from income beneficiaries authorizing the retention of earnings. If it cannot be established that the consent was
actuated by the financial needs of the corporation-and the cases suggest that the needs must be clear and pressing-such consent may result
in gift tax liability. The liability will depend on the answer to the
question whether and to what extent the rights of the income beneficiaries to the earnings of the corporation, viewed as a matter of local
law, were compromised by the consent. But since, as we have seen,
the local law situation defies any clear statement, it may be that, in
126A release of a general power of appointment is treated as a transfer of the
appointive property by the holder of the power and is subject to the provisions of
A lapse
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035-38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041 (a) (2).
of a power is considered as a release. IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041 (b) (2). Since
the income beneficiary of the trust retains a right to the income from the transferred
property (through his power to draw down the current earnings of the corporation
in subsequent years), § 2036 is applicable. As to the computations which have to be

made in relation to the $5,000 or 5% exception of § 2041(b) (2), see Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2041-3(d) (4) (1958). An interesting question would arise if his power is a
noncumulative power to draw down a stated amount of such earnings (e.g., $10,000),
an amount which is less than the average current earnings of the corporation but

exceeds the $5,000 or 5% exception of § 2041(b) (2). The question then would be
whether this power, as to future earnings, can be treated as a retention of the income
from the transferred property (i.e., the earnings which are not withdrawn pursuant
to this power).
127 Compare Florence S. Hyman, 1 T.C. 911 (1943); Emily Coles Collins, 1 T.C.
605 (1943); Rev. Rul. 56-431, 1956-2 Cum. BuLu. 171.
12 8
Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
927 (1956).
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this instance, the confusion will aid the beneficiaries against whom such
In any case, it would seem that blanket cona liability is asserted.'
sents to the retention of all earnings present and future should be
avoided, since in such a case the Commissioner may rely on his tables
for the valuation of the life interest given away through such consent.'
IV. CoNcLUSION

The abject failure of the law of trusts to provide a workable rule
on the question of retention and distribution of earnings of a business
held in trust-a matter vital to the success of any business-makes it
almost impossible to plan for the retention of a business in trust except
in an incorporated form. The line drawn between principal and income,
based on distinctions between repairs and improvements, between "temporary" and "permanent" improvements, between "wasting assets" and
not-so-wasting assets, between "amortization" and "depreciation,"
along with countless other confused ideas,' 3 ' impose singly and collectively a rigid stranglehold on the trustee-controlled business enterprise
of the kind which often cannot be avoided, even by careful draftsmanship, without incurring adverse tax consequences.
One may contemplate with horror a world in which all big businesses are run by pension and profit-sharing plans and all small businesses by trustees. But it seems unlikely that the advent of the second
part of this world would be greatly hastened by allowing-for the few
cases in which it makes sense to retain a business in trust-that the
law ought not to furnish the testator with a vehicle which, without
some expensive repairs, is headed, with his business, for the scrap heap.
129 When it is uncertain what amount of the earnings, if any, would be required
to be distributed by a trustee if the beneficiary pressed his right to such distribution,
it may30 be impossible to value the gift made by him when he has released such right.
1 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1958). The tables do not appear to be conclusive.
But the ComSee MERTENs, FDmAL GIFT & EsTATE TAXAnON § 7.08 (1959).
missioner has pressed them so hard when the actual return was less than 3/2% (the
return postulated in the tables) that it would be fascinating to see what would happen
should the current income beneficiary release all of his rights in the earnings in
excess of a return of 3312%.
131 Even the relatively modern provisions of § 7 of the UNIwo0m PRINCIPAL AND
IxcomE AcT, with its blind faith in "accepted" accounting practices, offers little solace
to the settlor or trust lawyer. See Krasnowiecki 508-15.

